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In  this  paper  we  explore  the  consequences  for  optimality  of  a  social  planner  adopting  two 
different welfare criteria. The framework of analysis is an OLG model with physical and human 
capital. We first show that, when the SWF is a discounted sum of individual utilities defined over 
consumption  per  unit  of  natural  labour,  the  precise  cardinalization  of  the  individual  utility 
function becomes crucial for the characterization of the social optimum. Also, decentralizing the 
social optimum requires an education subsidy. In contrast, when the SWF is a discounted sum of 
individual  utilities  defined  over  consumption  per  unit  of  efficient  labour,  the  precise 
cardinalization of preferences becomes irrelevant. More strikingly, along the optimal growth path, 
education should be taxed. 
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In optimal growth theory, the choice of the social planner's objective function has not always been
without controversy. Among the earliest contributions, Ramsey (1928), was primarily concerned
with the implications of maximizing an innite, undiscounted sum of present and future individual
utility. For Ramsey, the discount of later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones was an ethically
indefensible practice. Instead, Cass (1965) was concerned with maximizing an innite discounted
sum of individual utilities. A dierent approach was adopted by Phelps (1961), who proposed that
we should seek to maximize consumption per capita, rather than utilities.
Turning to an explicit OLG framework, in the late 50s, Samuelson (1958) advocated for the
maximization of individual lifetime utility, while Lerner (1959) considered more appropriate the
maximization of the current utility of individuals of dierent ages concurring at the same time
period. This, of course, concerns the case where individuals are pure life-cyclers  a la Diamond
(1965). But if individuals are altruistic, as in Barro (1974), and behave as if they maximized
dynastic utility, a new alternative appears between considering only the welfare level enjoyed by a
representative child (Carmichael, 1982) or by all children (Burbidge, 1983). Clearly, each of these
views of social welfare leads to a dierent optimal allocation.
All of the examples above refer to economies without productivity growth, in which a steady
state is a situation where consumption levels per unit of (natural) labour are kept constant. In the
presence of productivity growth that translates into consumption growth, however, these consump-
tion levels will grow without any limit. Under these circumstances, if a social planner adopted a
social welfare function whose arguments were utility functions dened over individual consumptions
per unit of natural labour, it is clear that, for plausible specications, the utility index would be
growing without limit. Since utility will eventually be innite along a balanced growth path, there
would simply be no scope for utility maximization. A way to sidestep this is of course to assume
that the planner maximizes a discounted sum of utilities. This is a standard procedure, and it is
indeed the one adopted among others by Docquier, Paddison and Pestieau (2007) (henceforth DPP)
to characterize the optimal balanced growth path in an endogenous growth setting. Focusing on
optimal policies along the balanced growth path, DPP (2007) identify the subsidy that internalizes
the externality associated with investing on education and the scheme of intergenerational transfers
between old and middle-aged individuals. On the basis of a particular example, they claim that, on
pure eciency grounds, the case for public pensions is rather weak.
In this paper, we evaluate the consequences of the planner adopting a dierent welfare criterion.
In particular, we will compare the results in DPP (2007) with those obtained when the planner
maximizes a discounted sum of individual utilities dened over consumption levels per unit of
ecient labour. As it will become clear, on the one hand, this new social welfare function depends
on utility indices which, in turn, are obtained from a utility function that respects individual
ordinal preferences for present and future consumption. On the other hand, like any SWF that
embodies utility discounting, it does not treat individuals from dierent generations equally. More
1particularly, for a given discount factor, the more human capital a generation is endowed with, the
lower its weight in this new social welfare function. This idea is not totally opposed to some notion
of social justice.
We rst show that, when, as in DPP (2007), the social planner maximizes a SWF whose ar-
guments are utility levels derived from individual consumptions per unit of natural labour (which
we will label "the standard approach"), the precise cardinalization of the individual utility func-
tion is crucial for both the characterization of the social optimum and the policies that support
it. Decentralizing the social optimum requires an education subsidy that is denitely positive, but
its size depends in a determinant way on the aforementioned cardinalization. In contrast, under
"the alternative approach", when the planner maximizes a SWF whose arguments are individual
utilities dened over individual consumptions per unit of ecient labour, the precise cardinalization
of preferences becomes irrelevant. More strikingly, the optimal education subsidy is negative, i.e.,
the planner should tax rather than subsidize investments on human capital. The reason is that
individuals choose their human capital investments accounting only for the eects on their earnings
and loan repayment costs. Thus, in a laissez-faire economy, if individuals faced the optimal wage
and interest rates, they would ignore the costs associated with maintaining these factor prices at
their optimal balanced growth path level when human capital increases. Under these circumstances,
they would over-invest in education. This is the reason why a tax is required to decentralize the
optimum. With respect to the accompanying scheme of intergenerational transfers, we make patent
that nothing can be said in general.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework and
the decentralized solution in presence of the government. Section 3 analyzes the consequences of
adopting the two alternative welfare criteria and Section 4 concludes.
2 The model and the decentralized solution
The basic framework of analysis is the overlapping generations model with both human and physical
capital developed in Boldrin and Montes (2005) and DPP (2007). Individuals live for three periods.
At period t, Nt+1 individuals are born. They coexist with Nt middle-aged and Nt 1 old-aged. A
young individual at t is endowed with the current level of human capital (i.e., knowledge or labour
eciency), ht, which, combined with the amount of output devoted to education, et , produces
human capital at period t + 1 according to the production function ht+1 = (ht;et): Assuming
constant returns to scale, the production of human capital can be written in intensive terms as
ht+1=ht = '( et); where  et = et=ht and '(:) satises the Inada conditions. The middle-aged at
period t, Nt, work and provide one unit of labour of eciency ht, and consume ct. Finally, the
Nt 1 old individuals are retired and consume dt. Population grows at the exogenous rate n so that
Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1 with n >  1.
A single good is produced by means of physical capital Kt and human capital Ht, using a
neoclassical constant returns to scale technology, F(Kt;Ht), where Ht = htNt. Physical capital
2fully depreciates each period. If we dene kt = Kt=Nt as the capital-labour ratio in natural units
and  kt = Kt=Ht = kt=ht as the capital-labour ratio in eciency units, this production function can
be described as htNtf( kt), where f(:) also satises the Inada conditions.
The lifetime welfare attained by an individual born at period t 1, Ut, can be written by means
of the utility function
Ut = U(ct;dt+1) (1)
As usual in consumer theory, (1) is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. Furthermore, for the
discussion of balanced growth paths to make sense, the utility function should also be homothetic.
Boldrin and Montes (2005) do not explicitly refer to the shape of indierence curves, but use
instead an equivalent condition (Assumption 2). The above refers to consumer's behavior. In order
to ensure that the social planner's problem is well behaved, additional restrictions are needed. In
particular, (1) is required to be homogeneous of degree b < 1, this guaranteeing both homotheticity
and strict concavity. In section 3, this technicallity will be shown to fundamentally aect the social
optimum (and thus the optimal policy) in DPP (2007)'s framework. However, it will also be argued
therein that the degree of homogeneity of the utility function and the ensuing cardinalization of
preferences is dispensable in an alternative framework.
Total output produced in period t, F(Kt;Ht); can be devoted to consumption, Ntct + Nt 1dt,
investment on physical capital, Kt+1, and investment on human capital, Nt+1et. Thus, the aggregate
feasibility constraint expressed in units of (natural) labour is
htf(kt=ht) = ct +
dt
1 + n
+ (1 + n)et + (1 + n)kt+1 (2)
Alternatively, we can divide (2) by ht and obtain the aggregate feasibility constraint in period t
with all the variables expressed in terms of output per unit of ecient labour
f( kt) =  ct +
 dt
'( et 1)(1 + n)
+ (1 + n) et + '( et)(1 + n) kt+1 (3)
where  ct = ct=ht and  dt = dt=ht 1.1
We can now describe the behavior of the decentralized economy in the presence of government
intervention. We focus on the three tax instruments considered in DPP (2007), namely, a subsidy
on educational spending and two lump-sum taxes in the periods of work and retirement. For an
individual born in t   1, let these instruments be t 1, T1
t and T2
t+1. Of course one can always
recover the laissez faire equilibrium by forcing t 1 = T1
t = T2
t+1 = 0:
In order to study the interaction among the individuals and the government, a careful description
of their behavior is required. Under perfect competition, each factor is paid its marginal product, so
that the rate of return on physical capital and the wage rate (per unit of ecient labour) are given
by 1 + rt = f0( kt) and wt = f( kt)    ktf0( kt): In their rst period, individuals choose the amount
1Note that ctNt and dtNt 1 are expressed in units of output. Since middle-aged individuals supply one unit of
natural labour, ct and dt are expressed in units of output per unit of natural labour. The interpretation of  ct and  dt
in terms of units of output per unit of ecient labour follows naturally.
3of education that maximizes their lifetime resources. We assume that competitive credit markets
exist in which young agents can borrow to buy education. They borrow (1   t 1)et 1 and are
subsidised t 1et 1. At time t, when they are middle-aged, they inelastically supply one unit of
labour of eciency ht, for which they obtain the wage rate wt. They also consume ct, save st, repay
the loan at the going interest rate rt and pay the lump-sum tax T1
t . In period t+1, when they are
old, they retire and consume dt+1 out of their savings, after having paid T2
t+1. The lifetime budget










Individuals save for pure life-cycle reasons, i.e. to transfer purchasing power from the second to the
third period. They maximize U(ct;dt+1) by the choice of et 1, ct and dt+1 subject to (4). The rst
order conditions write:
wt'0( et 1) = (1 + rt)(1   t 1) (5)
@U(ct;dt+1)=@ct
@U(ct;dt+1)=@dt+1
= (1 + rt+1) (6)
Since the government nances education subsidies by means of the lump-sum taxes T1
t and T2
t ,






= (1 + n)tet (7)
Equilibrium in the market for physical capital is achieved when the physical capital stock avail-
able in t+1, Kt+1, equals savings made by the middle-aged in t, stLt, minus the liabilities associated
with the human capital investment by the young in t; (1   t)etLt+1:
(1 + n)kt+1 = wtht   (1 + rt)(1   t 1)et 1   T1
t   ct   (1 + n)(1   t)et (8)
Notice that (7), (8) and the individual budget constraints in middle age and old age, allow to recover
the aggregate feasibility constraint (2). Equilibrium condition (8) can be written, in units of output
per ecient labour,
(1 + n)'( et) kt+1 = wt  
(1 + rt)(1   t 1) et 1
'( et 1)
   T1
t    ct   (1 + n)(1   t)  et (9)
The homogeneity of preferences implies that ct and  ct are, respectively, a fraction depending on
rt+1 of the right hand side of (4) and of the right hand side of (4) divided by ht. On the other
hand, (5) characterizes  et 1 for given values of  kt and t 1, i.e.,  et 1 = ( kt;t 1). Allowing for the
government budget constraint (7) to be expressed in terms of output per unit of ecient labour,
it then follows that (9) implicitly provides  kt+1 as a function 	( kt;  T1
t ;  T1
t+1;t;t+1). Along a
balanced growth path, all variables expressed in terms of output per unit of natural labour will be
2The periodical budget constraints in periods t and t + 1 are ct = wtht   (1 + rt)(1   t 1)et 1   T
1
t   st and
dt+1 = (1 + rt+1)st   T
2
t+1 respectively. From them, (4) can be directly found.
4growing at a constant rate. Thus all variables expressed in terms of output per unit of ecient
labour, including factor payments, will remain constant over time. We can then delete the time
subscripts and write  k = 	( k;  T1;). An equilibrium ratio of physical capital to labour in eciency
units, along a balanced growth path and in the presence of government intervention, will then be
a xed point of the 	 function. Assuming that such a balanced growth path is unique and locally
stable, we can write  k =  k( T1;).
We can now turn to the determination of  e or, since 1 + g = '( e), the characterization of the
growth rate g of any variable expressed in terms of output per unit of natural labour. The amount of
output devoted to education per unit of inherited human capital along a balanced growth path will be
governed by (5), so that  e = 
  k( T1;);

or,  e =  e( T1;). It then follows that 1+g = '( e( T1;)).
Finally, the growth rate of all variables expressed in absolute terms (physical capital, human capital
and output) is (1 + g)(1 + n).
3 The planner's problem
As we have already mentioned, along a balanced growth path, all variables expressed in units of
natural labour will be growing at a constant rate, g. Under these circumstances, if a social planner
adopted a social welfare function whose arguments were utility functions dened over consumption
per unit of natural labour, it is clear that, for plausible specications, the utility index Ut in (1)
would be growing without limit. Since utility will eventually be innite along a balanced growth
path, there is simply no scope for utility maximization. A way to sidestep this is to assume that
the planner maximizes a discounted sum of utilities. This is a standard procedure, and it is indeed
the one adopted by DPP (2007) to characterize the optimal balanced growth path. But even if
we accept that future utilities should be discounted at an arbitrary rate (i.e., if discounting is not
deemed immoral, in Ramsey's words), one can ask whether there are some other uncomfortable
consequences of this way to tackle the issue. One of the purposes of this section is precisely to
show that, in this case, the specic cardinalization of the individual utility function (i.e., the degree
of homogeneity of (1)) fundamentally aects the optimal solution to the planner's problem. As a
result, the optimal policy varies when we use dierent utility specications representing the same
individual ordinal preferences. One could reasonably claim that the crucial dependence of the
results of an entirely arbitrary cardinalization of the utility function is an unpleasant feature of this
approach.
The second purpose of this section is to present an alternative approach. We start by noticing
that, with homogeneous (of any degree) utilities, the same individual ordinal preferences can be
represented using as variables consumptions per unit of natural labour or consumptions per unit of
ecient labour. Further, along a balanced growth path, consumptions per unit of ecient labour,
 ct and  dt, will be kept constant. It is then clear that if the social planner adopted a social welfare
function whose arguments were utility functions dened over consumptions per unit of ecient
labour, the utility index, U( ct;  dt), would be nite. More importantly, as we show below, the optimal
5balanced growth path is independent of the precise cardinalization of the utility function. Hence, the
optimal policy is invariant to transformations of the utility function that preserve individual ordinal
preferences. As a consequence, positing a social welfare function whose arguments are consumptions
per unit of labour eciency emerges as a reasonable alternative or at least one that deserves some
attention. We explore the consequences of doing so, focusing on the dierent resource allocations
associated with the social planner adopting the two welfare criteria outlined above and, particularly,
the value of the optimal education subsidy in each case.
3.1 The standard approach
Let  < 1 be the social planner's discount factor. Since the planner now maximizes a discounted






which is maximized subject to the sequence of aggregate feasibility constraints (2) and the sequence
of human capital production functions ht+1 = ht'( et); for given initial values of k0, h0 and d0.
The optimum of this planner's problem can be characterized by the rst-order conditions with
respect to ct, dt, kt+1, ht+1 and et and the transversality conditions. Let the subscript  stand for
optimal values and the superscript N refer to the case where the planner cares for utility dened
over consumption per unit of natural labour. Following DPP (2007), the optimum balanced growth
path can be characterized by the following conditions
@U( cN
 ;  dN
 )=@ c
@U( cN
 ;  dN

























and the balanced growth path version of (3). These conditions provide four equations that, together,
determine the optimal levels of  c,  d,  k,  e.
Equation (11) is the equality of the marginal rate of substitution between second and third
period consumptions and the marginal product of physical capital. Observe that it is expressed in
terms of the marginal utilities of consumptions per unit of ecient labour. The reason why this
can be done is a mere consequence of the assumption of homothetic preferences, which implies that
the slope and curvature of the indierence curves in (ct;dt+1) space are the same as the those of
6the indierence curves in
 
 ct;  dt+1

space.3 In turn, (12) is the Modied Golden Rule derived in
this environment. As stressed by DPP (2007), the innite sum in (10) will converge provided that
['( eN
 )]b < 1. This implies that f0( kN
 ) > (1 + n)'( eN
 ); i.e., that, along the optimum balanced
growth path, the marginal product of physical capital exceeds the economy's growth rate. Finally,
(13) provides the optimal accumulation of human capital. This equation reects the fact that, when
a marginal unit of output is invested on education, not only next period human capital but also
future generation's labour eciency increases. In other words, there is a positive intergenerational
externality from investing on education. From this point of view, when one compares (13) and (5),














and is positive by virtue of the concavity of the '(:) function.
It is also clear from expression (12) that the degree of homogeneity of the individual utility
function b emerges as a vital element in the determination of  kN
 and  eN
 : This is tantamount to
saying that dierent cardinalizations of the preferences underlying the individual utility function
(1) will yield dierent values of  kN
 and  eN
 and, as a result, dierent tax parameters supporting
them.
In particular, the optimal subsidy N
 will depend on the precise cardinalization. This point can
be illustrated with the "triple Cobb-Douglas case" used in Appendix C of DPP (2007). They write
the individual utility function as U(ct;dt+1) = ln ct +  ln dt+1; with  > 0. Clearly, this function
is not homogeneous, although it can be interpreted to represent the case where b = 0. To emphasize




t+1 ; with 0 <  < 1; which is strictly concave and homogeneous of degree b < 1.
Notice that the ordinal representation of these preferences is the same as the logarithmic one when
we take  = (1   )=. With the production function of human capital '( e) = B e, where B > 0
and 0 <  < 1; one has '0( e) = B e 1 = (1 + g)= e: Then, using (12), (13) becomes
w( k
N)'0( e
N) = f0( k
N)





Therefore, the optimal subsidy (14) is now given by 
N = (1   )'( e
N)b; and clearly depends on
the degree of homogeneity of the utility function. Of course, when b = 0, which as stated above can
be taken to be equivalent to assuming logarithmic preferences, we are back to expressions (C.5) and
(C.6) in DPP (2007): w( k
N)'0( e
N) = f0( k
N)(1   
N) and 
N = (1   ); which is independent










With a similar result applying to @U()=@dt+1, it follows that the marginal rates of substitution are the same when
expressed in terms of ct;dt+1 or  ct;  dt+1.
7of b. As a matter of fact, this is the only case where the parameter b becomes irrelevant when the
planner's social welfare function depends on consumptions per unit of natural labour.
To stress this point again, the education subsidy is denitely positive, but its size depends on
the precise cardinalization of preferences (i.e., the parameter b). From a mathematical point of
view, this fact is not odd, since dierent objective functions will entail dierent solutions and thus
dierent tax parameters that will decentralize them. However, this is a rather uncomfortable feature
because dierent mathematical specications representing the same economic problem translate into
dierent optimal choices. Indeed, while the behavior of the individual is the same for all b, the social
optimum and the optimal policy are not. Admittedly, it is unclear how the planner is going to posit
one specic value of this parameter. Thus, the optimal policy becomes somewhat arbitrary. In
contrast, as we show in the next subsection, this inconvenience does not emerge when the planner's
objective function changes slightly.4
Before turning to the next subsection, however, it is worth stressing that the dependence of the
optimal policy on the degree of homogeneity of the utility function is not inherent to the endogenous
growth nature of the model. To see this, consider a model  a la Diamond (1965) where, in addition
to population growth at rate n, there is growth of labour eciency, ht, at a constant rate g, as a
consequence of labour-augmenting or Harrod-neutral technical progress: ht = (1 + g)ht 1. Since
g is now exogenously given, and without any loss of generality, we can force et = 0 in (2) so that
the planner chooses ct;dt;kt+1 that maximize (10) subject to the sequence of aggregate feasibility
constraints (2) dismissing the amounts et. From the rst order conditions, we obtain the Modied
Golden Rule, i.e., f0(:) = (1 + g)1 b(1 + n) which amounts to (12) in the current context. Once
again, the role of the parameter b is determinant for the characterization of the optimal allocation.
This is in contrast with what happens in Diamond (1965)'s framework when technical progress is
assumed away: the Modied Golden Rule then writes f0(:) = 1+n, this being independent of the
precise cardinalization of the individual utility function.
3.2 An alternative approach
The preceding discussion invites to consider some alternative welfare criterion. In particular, it
seems legitimate to explore the consequences of the social planner adopting a social welfare function
that is respectful with individual preferences and gives rise to a social optimum which is independent
of the specic cardinalization of such preferences. In this section we show that this can be done by
postulating a social welfare function that is based on utilities of consumptions per unit of ecient
labour. Observe that this was actually the procedure followed when writing expression (11) above:
marginal utilities from consumption therein (and thus the marginal rate of substitution between
them) were written in terms of consumptions per unit of ecient labour, i.e., the only variables
that it makes sense to consider along a balanced growth path.
4With respect to the optimal values of the lump sum-taxes T
1 and T
2 along the balanced growth path, although
DPP (2007) argue that, in the triple Cobb-Douglas case, T
2 can have any sign, they also claim that, for reasonable
weights given to future generations, the case for public pensions is weak (p. 373).
8Since the utility function is homogeneous of degree b, we can take the monotonic transformation
of Ut resulting from dividing by ht in (1), and obtain a new utility index while ensuring that ordinal
preferences are respected:
 Ut = Ut=hb
t = (1=hb
t)U(ct;dt+1) = U (ct=ht;dt+1=ht) = U( ct;  dt+1) (16)
It is worth emphasizing, rst, that ht is given at the beginning of period t, so that this procedure
is nothing else but a mere change of variable. And, second, that the utility function in (16) has
exactly the same functional form as (1), and thus continues to be homogenous of degree b. Otherwise,
we can continue to posit that the social planner's objective is to maximize a discounted (with a





tU( ct;  dt+1) (17)
A natural question is, of course, what is the relationship between W and  W. Using (16) and
allowing for the fact that ht =
Qt
i=1(1 + gi)h0 , where the productivity growth rate gi veries



















i=1(1 + gi)bU(ct;dt+1) (18)
Clearly, in addition to the conventional constant discount factor , the social welfare function (17),
or, equivalently, (18) discounts the utility of future generation's consumptions at a variable rate
that explicitly accounts for the level of human capital they are endowed with. In other words,
the weight of successive generations in the new social welfare function is inversely related to their
inherited knowledge.
The planner's problem is to maximize (17) subject to the sequence of aggregate feasibility
constraints (3), for given values of  k0;  d0;  e 1: As before, the optimum can be characterized by the
rst order conditions with respect to  ct,  dt,  kt+1 and  et, and the transversality conditions. The












'( et 1)(1 + n)
  f( kt) + (1 + n)'( et) kt+1 + (1 + n) et

(19)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint at time t. From the rst
order conditions corresponding to  ct,  dt,  kt+1,  et and t we obtain
@U( ct;  dt+1)=@ ct
@U( ct;  dt+1)=@  dt+1
= f0( kt+1) (20)
@U( ct;  dt+1)=@ ct
@U( ct 1;  dt)=@  dt
=









as well as (3). The interpretation of (20) and (21) is straightforward. The rst one reects the equal-
ity of the intertemporal rates of substitution in consumption and of transformation in production
between periods t and t + 1. The second one captures the static conditions of optimal distribution
of consumption available in period t between middle-aged and old-aged individuals. Expression
(22) can be interpreted as an arbitrage condition between the returns from investing on physical
capital and on education. The intuition can be grasped making use of the fact that t (resp. t+1)
is the shadow value (in terms of social welfare  W) of a unit of output per ecient labour in period
t (resp. t + 1). Suppose that in period t the social planner slightly increases  kt+1. It is clear from
(3) that this will aect the feasibility constraint at periods t and t + 1: a higher  kt+1 implies a
reduction in the resources left for consumption in period t, given by (1+n)'( et), and an increase of
the resources available for consumption in period t + 1, captured by f0( kt+1). Thus, the marginal
cost of investing in physical capital is t(1 + n)'( et) and the marginal benet is t+1f0( kt+1). The
rst order condition for  kt+1 imposes that these marginal cost and benet should be equal at the
optimum. If, instead, the planner increases  et, the feasibility constraints at periods t and t + 1 will
also be modied. The cost, incurred in period t, has now two components. On the one hand, there
is a direct cost, (1 + n), that reduces consumption possibilities. But there is also an indirect cost,
given by '0( et)(1 + n) kt+1: as a consequence of the eect of  et on the growth rate, the amount of
output devoted to investment in physical capital must be increased if we are to achieve the optimal
value of  kt+1. Using the shadow value t, the marginal cost of an increased investment on education
is thus t[(1 + n) + '0( et)(1 + n) kt+1]. The benets, however, do not take place until period t + 1.
Indeed, evaluating (3) at t + 1, the increased growth rate lowers the marginal rate of transforma-
tion between third and second period consumption in the RHS. This amounts to an expansion of
consumption possibilities, so that the marginal benet is t+1'0( et)(1 + n) dt+1=['( et)(1 + n)]2. As
before, the rst order condition for  et imposes that these marginal costs and benets should be
equal at the optimum. Both rst order conditions involve the same ratio of shadow values, t=t+1,
so that an arbitrage condition between the returns from investing on  kt+1 and  et, measured in units
of resources at t + 1 per unit of resources at t, can be derived. This is precisely the way expression
(22) is obtained.
In order to identify the nature of the education externality it proves practical to use the feasibility
constraint (3) evaluated at t + 1 to write the arbitrage condition (22) in a way that resembles (5):










Since the individual always behaves according to the utility function (1) regardless of the social
welfare function adopted by the planner, one has to compare (23) with (5). Then, it becomes clear
that we are facing a situation that we can characterize as a negative externality. Needless to say,
this is in sharp contrast with DPP (2007).
10Before turning to explain the intuition underlying this result, we can characterize the optimal
balanced growth path, where all variables expressed in terms of output per unit of ecient labour,
 c,  d,  k and  e, remain constant. Letting the superscript E refer to the case where the planner cares
for utility dened over consumption per unit of ecient labour, the optimal balanced growth path
can be characterized by the following equations:
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in addition to the balanced growth path version of (3). Together, these four equations provide the
optimal levels of  c,  d,  k and  e.
Conditions (24) and (25) have the exact same interpretation as their counterparts (11) and (12).
The second one, in particular, states that, at the Modied Golden Rule, the marginal product of
physical capital will be greater than the economy's growth rate. Yet, the Modied Golden Rule
(25) is independent of the specic cardinalization of the individual preferences. In other words, the
degree of homogeneity b is now irrelevant. The reason why dierent Modied Golden Rules result
under the two approaches is simply that the social planner is applying dierent discount factors to
individual utility levels dened over consumption per unit of natural labour. To see this, assume
for a moment that the rate of productivity growth is exogenously given at g (although, of course,
a similar reasoning applies when g is endogenous). Observe that, when the social welfare function
(17) is rewritten as (18), i.e., in terms of consumptions per unit of natural labour, the discount
factor is 0 = =(1 + g)b. Thus, for a given rate of productivity growth, plugging 0 into (12) one
obtains [=(1+g)b]f0(:)=(1+n) = (1+g)1 b, which is nothing else but f0(:)=(1+n) = (1+g), that
is, condition (25). This is the counterpart, with productivity growth, of other well known instances
in optimal growth theory without productivity growth, where using dierent discount factors yields
dierent optimum allocations.5
Coming back to our endogenous growth framework, and as we have already pointed out, condi-
tion (26) is nothing else but the arbitrage condition (22) written in a way that allows to compare it
with the individual decision. It is then clear that, if  = 0 and the individual were confronted with
the (optimal) wage and interest rates, w( kE
 ) and f0( kE
 ), she would fail to take into account the
5In a model  a la Diamond (1965) without productivity growth, consider the alternative social criteria of maximizing









One can easily show that, in the former case, the Modied Golden Rule entails f
0(:) = (1+n) . With respect to the
latter, it can be analyzed in terms of the former by rewriting the discount factor as 
0 = (1 + n). Thus, under "the
more, the merrier" approach, the modied Golden Rule becomes f
0(:) = 1. This parallels the reasoning given in the
main text.
11following costs associated with an increase in the investment on education: (i) the investment in
physical capital (per unit of ecient labour) required to keep the optimal  k,  kE
 , constant along the
balanced growth path, ('( eE
 )(1+n) kE
 ), (ii) its counterpart, referred to  eE
 , i.e., the investment in
human capital required to keep  e constant at its optimal balanced growth path level  eE
 ((1+n) eE
 ),
and (iii) the total consumption of the middle aged (per unit of ecient labour) necessary to keep  c
constant. In these circumstances, as the individual does not account for these costs, she over-invests
in education and a tax is required.
From the above discussion we can identify the value of the tax parameter addressed to education
decisions along the optimal balanced growth path. Observe that by virtue of the homotheticity of
preferences, (24) allows to express the ratio  cE= dE as a function of f0( kE
 ) and, using (25), of the
growth rate of the economy '( eE
 )(1+n). Using the balanced growth path version of (3), one readily
obtains  cE
 as a function of  kE
 and  eE
 , i.e.,  c( kE
 ;  eE
 ): Then, comparing (26) with (5), it becomes
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It is also important to note that education expenditures should not only be taxed along the optimal
balanced growth path but also along the entire optimal growth path. This follows in an obvious
way from the second term in parentheses in the RHS of (23).
To conclude, one can ask if there is a systematic underlying relationship between  kN
 and  kE
 , on
the one hand, and  eN
 and  eE
 , on the other. Such a systematic relationship does, however, not exist.
Comparing these values is not an easy task, because  kN
 (resp.  kE
 ) and  eN
 ( eE
 ) are simultaneously
determined by dierent systems of equations. We have used the "triple Cobb-Douglas case" to
undertake these comparisons. The simulation results suggest that any combination of relative
orderings is possible. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, the degree of homogeneity b is
present in (12) but not in (25). Second, the rate of time preference ; used in the Cobb-Douglas
example as reported in subsection 3.1, which plays no role whatsoever in (11)-(13), is however
present in (24)-(26) through the  c( kE
 ;  eE
 ) function.
Two further comments seem in order. The rst one concerns the parallel of DPP (2007)'s claim
that in their framework the case for public pensions (i.e.,  T2N
 < 0) is weak. As shown in the
Appendix, under the alternative approach discussed in this subsection, nothing can be said with
generality about the sign of  T2E
 . The second comment refers to the consequences of the social
planner adopting the social welfare function (17) in a model with exogenous productivity growth
(i.e., an exogenously given value of g and et = 0 for all t). It can easily be veried that the Modied
Golden Rule is then given by f0(:) = (1 + g)(1 + n). As in (25), the degree of homogeneity b of
the individual utility function is irrelevant for the characterization of the optimal balanced growth
path. The fact that the Modied Golden Rule does not depend on the parameter b is clearly not a
characteristic of the endogenous growth nature of the model above.
124 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have used an OLG model with physical and human capital to ascertain the
consequences for optimality of a social planner adopting two dierent welfare criteria that are
respectful of individual preferences. In both cases, the SWF is a discounted sum of individual
utilities, the dierence being whether consumption is considered in terms of output per unit of
natural or ecient labour. The results suggest that, in a sense, we are forced to choose between
two alternative scenarios. On the one hand, if the planner maximizes a SWF with individual utility
functions dened over consumption per unit of natural labour, we require a precise cardinalization of
preferences, this cardinalization playing a crucial role in the resulting size of the education subsidy.
On the other hand, if the planner maximizes a SWF with individual utility functions dened over
consumption in terms of units of ecient labour, we do not require any cardinalization but, now,
along the balanced growth path, the government should impose a tax (instead of a subsidy) on
education.
To conclude, it should be stressed that although this paper has focused on the implications
of the social planner adopting two dierent welfare criteria, one should not forget that some of
the assumptions underlying the model are quite unrealistic. In particular this can be said of the
assumption that individuals have access to perfect credit markets. Indeed, the insights emerging
from the analysis may be dierent depending on whether or not individuals face constraints when
trying to borrow to nance their education investments. We leave these issues for further research.
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Appendix: The sign of  T2
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From (9), also along a balanced growth path,
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From the government budget constraint (7) expressed in eciency units and along the optimal
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< 0
which, since E
 < 0, is compatible with any sign of  T2E
 .
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